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RECALL IN WASHINGTON:
A TIME FOR REFORM
Michael L. Cohen*
Recall is the electoral process by which an elected officer is removed before the expiration of the term of office.1 All but 10 states
provide for the recall of public officers, 2 but Washington is the only
state whose constitution provides that recall by the electorate must be
for cause. 3 Concern over abuse of the recall process in Washington
has prompted a call for legislative reform.
Washington Supreme Court Justice Utter proposed legislative reform of the recall laws in a recent concurring opinion in Bocek v.
Bayley.4 That opinion, in which Justice Stafford joined, dealt not with
the substance of the present recall laws but rather with the reluctance
of the judiciary to assert itself in preventing misuse of the recall
* Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, King County; B.A., University of Washington, 1965; J.D., Georgetown University, 1969.
1. Ch. 146, [1913] Wash. Laws 454, codified in WASH. REV. CODE ch. 29.82
(1963), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
2. The 10 without provisions for recall are Alabama, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah and Vermont. Note, 48
WASH. L. REV. 505 n.6 (1973).
3. WASH. CONST. art. 1, §§ 33, 34 (amend. 8). Most state provisions require only a
general statement of the grounds on which the demand for recall is based. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; CAL. CONsT. art. XXIII, § 1. Alaska requires that recall
charges allege lack of fitness for office, incompetence, neglect of duties or corruption.
ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.510 (1971).
4. Justice Utter stated:
It makes no sense to affirm that we have recall for cause and then not have at
least a prima facie showing of the truth of the allegations made before the courts.
The remedy, as suggested in Cudihee v. Phelps, 76 Wash. 314, 331, 136 P. 367
(1913), may be for the legislature to more specifically state in the enabling
legislation that the courts are to first try the question of whether a prima facie
case for recall exists.
81 Wn. 2d 831, 839-40, 505 P.2d 814, 819 (1973).
Appellants in Bocek were three school district directors against whom a recall
campaign had been commenced by school district voters. The legal issues presented
by the case related solely to the sufficiency of the five charges upon which the recall
against each board member was based. The court paraphrased the charges:
The recall charges against the appellants involved allegations of misfeasance
and malfeasance while in office, as well as violations of the oath of office, and
were essentially as follows: Appellant Bocek was charged with an invasion of
privacy in allegedly publishing confidential information of the school district. All
three appellants were charged with having held secret meetings in violation of the
Open Public Meetings Act (RCW 42.30). Additionally, all three were charged
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process. 5 The court has limited the scope of judicial review in recall
cases to a facial examination of the recall charges to determine

whether the charges state sufficient cause for recall. 6 The supreme
court has consistently refused to consider the truth of the charges, 7 or
the motives 8 of the petitioners which prompt the recall of elective officers.
Although such a narrow scope of review accords with the court's
traditional role of nonintervention in political controversies,!, the nature of the recall is such that it encourages two abuses which would
not occur but for the court's refusal to consider them:
(1) The charges, though adequate on their face as cause for recall,
may lack any factual basis whatsoever;
(2) The charge may be entirely unrelated to the dispute; the real
political issue or dispute between the recall petitioners and the
elective officer may be submerged beneath the rhetoric of the
charge.
Recognition of these factors prompted Justice Utter, joined by Justice
Stafford, to comment in Bocek:' 0
with refusing to bargain in good faith. Lastly, the three appellants were charged
with employing an allegedly unqualified school superintendent.
Id. at 833-34, 505 P.2d at 815-16 (footnotes omitted).
The supreme court found each of the charges sufficient to support a recall and
remanded the matter for ultimate decision to the electorate of the Federal Way
School District.
5. Id. at 838, 505 P.2d at 818.
6. See, e.g., State ex rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks. 80 Wn.
2d 121, 124, 492 P.2d 536, 539 (1972).
7. See, e.g., Cudihee v. Phelps, 76 Wash. 314, 136 P. 367 (1913): Skidmore v.
Fuller. 59 Wn. 2d 818, 370 P.2d 975 (1962): State ex rel. LaMon v. Westport. 73 Wn.
2d 255, 438 P.2d 200 (1968).
8. See, e.g., Roberts v. Millikin, 200 Wash. 60, 93 P.2d 393 (1939): Skidmore v.
Fuller, 59 Wn. 2d 818, 370 P.2d 975 (1962).
9. See, e.g., State ex rel. Donohue v. Coe, 49 Wn. 2d 410, 302 P.2d 202 (1956)
(court lacked jurisdiction, absent statutory grant, to prohibit the secretary of state
from certifying an initiative measure to the ballot): State ex rel. Case v. Superior
Court, 81 Wash. 623, 143 P. 461 (1914) (judicial interference based upon express
statutory provisions). In Donohue, the court restated the limitation on judicial
authority:
In approaching the question of the power of the secretary and of the courts in
determining questions arising incidental to the submission of an initiative measure
to the voters, it is to be remembered that we are dealing with a political and not
a judicial question, except only in so far as there may be express statutory or
written constitutional law making the question judicial. Speaking generally. it
may be said that the legislature might have committed wholly to administrative
officers all questions arising under the law incidental to the submission of initiative
measures to the people, without any right of review in the courts whatever, except.
possibly, pure questions of law.
49 Wn. 2d at 417, 302 P.2d at 206, quoting Case, supra at 633-34, 143 P. at 464.
10. 81 Wn. 2d at 839, 505 P.2d at 819 (emphasis added).

Recall in Washington
I concur in this case only because a majority of this court believe we
are bound by State ex rel. LaMon v. Westport, 73 Wn.2d. 255, 438
P.2d 200 (1968), and the authority upon which it is based. We there
held that courts are limited to examination of the charges stated and
cannot inquire into factual matters extraneous to the allegations. Although our proceedings for recall are theoretically to be for cause, the
interpretation LaMon and other cases place on this provision of our
constitution means that if a petitioner phrases the charge correctly, a
vote on recall will occur, regardless of whether actual cause on the issues stated exists and whether there is, in fact, any truth to the charge.
This procedure readily lends itself to public officials being made
subject to recall where the real issues for dissatisfaction are not publicly stated. The general public is denied both an opportunity to hear
debate on the real issues involved and the opportunity to make an intelligent choice on these issues. I cannot believe this was the intent of
the original drafters of our constitution.
In early cases raising the sufficiency of recall charges, the court
curbed abuse of the recall process by means of a careful and literal
reading of the constitutional recall provisions, and the statutes implementing those provisions. While other states have tolerated mistreatment of public officers through the recall process,'1 the Washington
court has interpreted both constitutional and statutory provisions as
expressions of an intent to preserve the remedy, while avoiding its
12
abuse.
A more recent trend, typified by LaMon and the "other cases," to
which Justice Utter referred, evidences a disposition to permit resolution of recalls through the ballot box rather than through the judicial
process. This recent trend, abandoning sub silentio the earlier precedents and severely eroding the extent of judicial review, has encouraged
a significant increase in the number of recall elections throughout the
state 13 and an expansion of the people's power of recall. Such expansion, however, is contrary to the intent of the framers of the constitutional recall provisions who sought to limit application of the recall to

11. See, e.g., State ex rel. Topping v. Houston, 94 Neb. 445, 143 N.W. 796 (1913);
Good v. Common Council, 5 Cal. App. 265, 90 P. 44 (1907).
12. See Cudihee v. Phelps, 76 Wash. 314, 136 P. 367 (1913); Gibson v. Campbell,
136 Wash. 467, 241 P. 21 (1925).
13. A total of 57 recall petitions have been circulated since 1913; 37 of these

have been filed in the past 10 years. See Appendix infra.
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the removal of "wrongdoers" occupying elective office.' 4 The abuse of
the recall, initially thwarted by adoption of the constitutional provisions, has thus emerged as a problem.
Other commentators' 5 who have examined the law of recall in
Washington agree with Justice Utter that new legislation is necessary
to redirect use of the recall so that it will function as intended in the
Washington political and governmental system. The purpose of this
article is threefold: (1) to trace the history of recall in Washington,
including the enactment of our present recall statutes and their fundamental principles; (2) to examine the reasons behind the apparent judicial retreat from those principles; and (3) to propose amendments to
6
the present recall statutes to implement the constitutional intent.'
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RECALL IN WASHINGTON

Provisions for the recall of public officers did not appear in the
Washington constitution until 1912 when a constitutional recall referendum, proposed by the state House of Representatives, was passed
by the voters.' 7 The constitution of 1889 provided two devices for
removal of officers: (1) impeachment of the governor, state officers
and members of the judiciary;' 8 and (2) judicial removal, for cause, of
all state officials not subject to impeachment.19 These devices are procedurally cumbersome and thus largely ineffective: Impeachment be-

14. See discussion of legislative intent in Part I infra. "Wrongdoers occupying
elective office" contemplates officers who commit malfeasance or misfeasance during
a term of office. or violate their oaths of office. See discussion in Part III-A infra.
15. See Note, 48 WASH, L. REv 503, 511 (1973) and Note, 8 GONZAGA L. REV.
831, 845 (1972).
16. The most material of these proposed amendments include: ( 1) the specification
of the constitutional grounds for recall: (2) the specification of the particularity with
which recall charges must be stated in the recall petition: (3) the grant of jurisdiction
to the courts to determine whether recall charges have a prima facie basis in fact.
See Part Ill infra.
17. Ch. 108§1. [19111 Wash. Laws 504.
18. W\sH CONS- art. V. § 2, provides:
The governor and other state and judicial officers. except judges and justices of
courts not of record, shall be liable to impeachment for high crimes or misdemeanors. or malfeasance in office, but judgment in such cases shall extend
only to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust
or profit, in the state. The party, whether convicted or acquitted, shall, nevertheless, be liable to prosecution, trial, judgment and punishment according to law.
19. WASH. CONST. art. V. §3, provides:
All officers not liable to impeachment shall be subject to removal for misconduct
or malfeasance in office, in such manner as may be provided by law.

Recall in Washington
fore the state legislature has been used against a Washington state
officer only once; 20 judicial removal has infrequently been used to rid
a public office of a wrongdoer 2 ' and seldom before that officer was
convicted of a crime relating to his public duties. 22 Since the constitutional removal provisions were not self-executing, it was left to the
legislature to set forth the specific acts of official misconduct that
would permit courts to declare an office forfeited by its elected occu23
pant.
Despite the lack of a constitutional recall provision prior to 1912,
recall of locally elected officers in Washington was not unknown. A
number of city charters provided for recall by the electorate. 24 These
recall provisions failed to include limitations on the grounds for recall
and thus left officers removable at public will. Recall petitioners were
required only to state in their petitions the basis of their disagreement
with the elected officer in question. The constitutionality of such recall
provisions was upheld in 1909 as an inherent power of the people
25
absent some constitutional limitation.

20. In 1909 the state House of Representatives voted to impeach John H. Shively,
then State Insurance Commissioner by a 90 to 0 vote. WASH. H.R. JOUR. 68 (Ex. Sess.
1909). Thereafter, Shively was acquitted in the state Senate although more than a
majority voted to convict. WASH. S. JOUR. 834-48 (Ex. Sess. 1909).
21. See, e.g., State ex rel. Knabb v. Frater, 198 Wash. 675, 89 P.2d 1046 (1939);
State v. Miller, 32 Wn. 2d 149, 201 P.2d 136 (1948); Directors of School Dist. No.
302 v. Libby, 135 Wash. 233, 237 P. 505 (1925).
22. See, e.g., State ex rel. Zempel v. Twitchell, 59 Wn. 2d 419, 367 P.2d 985
(1962); State ex rel. Carroll v. Simmons, 61 Wn. 2d 146, 377 P.2d 421 (1962).
23. The legislature enacted WASH. REV. CODE § 42.12.010 (1963), which provides:
Every office shall become vacant on the happening of either of the following
events before the expiration of the term of such officer. First, the death of the
incumbent; second, his resignation; third, his removal; fourth, his ceasing to be
an inhabitant of the district, county, town or village for which he shall have been
elected or appointed, or within which the duties of his office are to be discharged;
fifth, his conviction of an infamous crime, or of any offense involving a violation
of his official oath; sixth, his refusal or neglect to take his oath of office, or
to give or renew his official bond, or to deposit such oath or bond within the time
prescribed by law; seventh, the decision of a competent tribunal declaring void his
election or appointment; eighth, whenever a judgment shall be obtained against
such officer for breach of the condition of his official bond. [Emphasis added.]
In addition, the legislature has declared that any officer violating the provisions of the
code of ethics for municipal officers, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 42.23 (Supp. 1973), shall
forfeit his right to hold office. Id. § 42.23.050.
24.

See, e.g., EVERETT CITY CHARTER § 281 (1890); CHARTER OF THE CITY OF

SEATTLE art. XVIII, § 11 (1907).
25. Hilzinger v. Gillman, 56 Wash. 228, 105 P. 471 (1909). However, the same
was not true of the initiative and referendum, which were not within the power of
the people prior to their incorporation into the state constitution in 1912. See Ruano
v. Spellman, 81 Wn. 2d 820, 823, 505 P.2d 447, 449 (1973).
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These early recall provisions were intended to empower the public
to remove their elected officers at will as a demonstration of their disagreement with public policy on particular issues, just as the people
now have the right to overrule the legislature by exercise of the referendum and the initiative.2 6 As the Washington court noted in Stir27
tan v. Blethen:
It cannot be questioned that the recall and its usual concomitant,
the referendum, are wholesome means to the preservation of responsible popular government. They embody a principle as old as the Engglish constitution. The frequent appeals of the English ministry from
a vote of Parliament to a vote of the people on a given measure, requiring the members of Parliament to stand for reelection upon that
measure as an issue . . . is obviously but a recall as to the personnel
of the government and a referendum as to the given measure.
However, unlike its "concomitant, the referendum," recall at will
not only permitted recall petitioners to influence the decisions to which
they objected, but it also penalized public officers for taking a position
contrary to that of the recall petitioners. The recall provided the
majority of the voters with both a device for expressing their political
sentiments, and a weapon to brandish against the elected officer who
disagreed with a vociferous political group. Thus, the recall had the
potential of wreaking destruction when wielded by a mob or demagogue.
The danger that a public officer might bend his personal conviction
to a group's clamor to avoid an end to his political career was recog28
nized, but not alleviated, by the court in Hilzinger v. Gillman:
The whole scheme or system of the charter makes it apparent that the
right of recall of elective officers was reserved to the people, to be exercised at any time the public interest was thought to require it....
Like the British ministry, an elective officer under the charter is at all

26. In Yelle v. Kramer. 83 Wn. 2d 464, 476. 520 P.2d 927. 934 (1974). the supreme court explains:
By the referendum initiated either by a petition signed by the required number of
registered voters or by direction of the legislature itself, the electorate either
approves or rejects an act of the legislature. By the initiative the electorate may
propose and enact legislation whether it amends existing legislation or enters an
entirely new field.
27. 79 Wash. 10, 14, 139 P. 618, 620(1914).
28. 56Wash. 228,233-35, 105 P. 471,473 74(1909).

Recall in Washington
times answerable to the people for a failure to meet their approval on
measures of public policy ....
Whether the interests of the city will be better subserved by
a ready obedience to public sentiment than by a courageous adherence
to the views of the individual officer ...

is a political and not a legal

question.
Although the court in Hilzinger found the curbing of recall at will
to be beyond judicial power, the legislature in 1911 attempted to alleviate the danger with a referendum proposing a limitation on the people's power of recall. 29 The referendum, approved by the voters in
1912, added to the state constitution the present provisions for the
recall of elective officers. 30 A careful examination of the history of the
referendum clearly indicates that the legislature intended to distinguish the people's right to legislate by initiative from their power to
remove an elected officer by recall election, and to end recall at will of
elective officers.
The recall amendment to the state constitution was introduced in
the House as a constitutional referendum, House Bill 62 (H.B. 62).3 1
As initially introduced, H.B. 62 did not require that recall be predicated upon alleged acts of misfeasance or malfeasance while in office
32
or upon a violation of the oath of office.
Following its first reading, H.B. 62 was referred to the House

29.

Ch. 108, [1911] Wash. Laws 504.

30.

The referendum became the eighth amendment to the state constitution.

WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 33, 34.
31. WASH. H.R. JOUR. 56 (1911).

The proposed amendment contained two

sections: the first section dealt with the nature of the recall and set forth formulas
for the number of signatures necessary to place a recall on the ballot; the second
section directed the legislature to enact laws to render the recall operative. H.B. 62,
12th Sess., WASH. H.R. BILLS (1911).
32. Section I of H.B. 62 initially provided:

Every elective public officer in the State of Washington is subject to recall and
discharge by the legal voters of the state, or of the political subdivision of the
state, from which he was elected whenever a petition demanding his recall, setting

forth the reasons for such demand, signed by not less than twenty-five per cent. of
the qualified electors in the state, or political subdivision of the state, from
which he was elected, the percentage required to be computed from the total number of

votes cast for all candidates for his said office to which he was elected at the preceding election, is filed with the officer with whom a petition for nomination, or certificate for nomination, to such office must be filed under the laws of this state, and
the same officer shall call a special election as provided by the general election
laws of this state, and the result determined as therein provided.
H.B. 62, 12th Sess., WASH. H.R. BILLS (1911).
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Committee on Constitutional Reform, which after some dispute reported the bill out of committee on January 25, 1911.33 The minority
members of the committee recommended to the floor that the recall
referendum go to the people in its original language, without specifying the grounds for recall. 34 The majority of the committee, however, recommended to the floor of the House that the language of
H.B. 62 be amended in numerous ways.
In its crucial recommendation dealing with the requirement of specific grounds for recall, the committee majority recommended that the
words "setting forth the reasons for such demand" be stricken from
Section 1, and recommended the addition of the phrase "reciting that
such officer has committed some act or acts of malfeasance while in
office, or who [sic] has violated his oath of office, stating the matters
complained of."3 5 After extended debate, the committee majority's
36
proposal was incorporated into the recall referendum.
At stake in this episode of legislative history was the scope of the
constitutional recall provisions. The language stricken by the House
committee was similar to the recall language in the Everett City
Charter, which the state supreme court had construed in Hilzinger v.
Gillman:37 as permitting recall at will. The newly inserted reference to
malfeasance while in office was clearly taken from the removal provisions of the state constitution,3 8 which language had been construed
prior to 1911 as contemplating criminal activity by the elective public
39
officer before the commencement of judicial removal proceedings.
33. WASH.H.R. JOUR. 190( 1911).
34. The committee minority view was expressed in a letter which stated:
Mr. Speaker:
We. a minority of your committee on constitutional revision, to whom was
referred House Bill No. 62. entitled, "'An act to amend article one II)of the
constitution of the State of Washington. authorizing and empowering the voters
to call a special election at any time to recall and discharge any elective public
officer and to elect his successor, by adding thereto at the end of said article
one (1) two new sections, which shall be numbered sections 33 and 34 of said
article one (1),"have had the same under consideration, and we respectfully
report the same back to the House with the recommendation that it do pass.
WASH. H.R.JOUR. 191(1911).

35. ld. at 190.
36. Id. at 191.
37. 56 Wash. 228, 105 P 471 (1909).
38. See WASH.CONSTr. art. V, § 3.
39. See State ex rel. Whitney v. Friars. 10 Wash. 348. 39 P. 104 (1894). Pierce's

Code of Washington Criminal Laws at the time of the enactment of the recall referendum contained a crime "'malfeasance in office," now codified as WASH. REV. CODE
§ 42.20.080 (1963).
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The overlapping character of the recall and judicial removal provisions of the state constitution is also evidenced by the inclusion in the
recall referendum of the phrase "violation of his oath of office." 40
All oaths of office in Washington include the obligation to faithfully
discharge the duties of the particular office. 4 1 A failure to comply with
the oath constitutes nonfeasance in office, which is a misdemeanor, as
it was in 1911.42
The conclusion is inescapable that the drafters of the constitutional
recall provisions deliberately sought to eliminate recall at will and
permit recall only for cause. By requiring that recall petitions recite
acts previously construed as sufficiently wrongful to invoke criminal
penalties, the framers obviously intended to prevent recall elections
from reflecting on the popularity of the political decisions made by
elective officers. The passage of the committee majority's amendment
to H.B. 62 served to check the previously unfettered power of the
43
people to recall their elective officers at will.
A final piece of evidence from the eighth amendment itself further
documents the conclusion that its drafters consciously proposed a
44
limit on the people's power to recall. The eighth amendment states:
The legislature shall pass the necessary laws to carry out the provi40.

WASH. REv. CODE § 42.12.010 (1963), the judicial removal statute, specifically

makes conviction "of any offense involving a violation of his official oath" grounds
for the forfeiture of an elective office.
41. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 43.01.020 (1963), which provides that elected
state officers take the following oath:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution and laws of the state of Washington, and that I will
faithfully discharge the duties of the office of (name of office) to the best of my
ability. [Emphasis added.]
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.20.100 (1963), taken from § 82 [1854] Wash. Terr.
Laws 90, provides:
Whenever any duty is enjoined by law upon any public officer or other person
holding any public trust or employment, their willful neglect to perform such
duty, except where otherwise specially provided for, shall be a misdemeanor.
For applications of this statute to particular officers' misconduct, see State v. Sefrit,
82 Wash. 520, 144 P. 725 (1914); State v. Twitchell, 61 Wn. 2d 403, 378 P.2d 444
(1963).
43. The cases involving the right to recall decided immediately before and
immediately after the recall amendment was adopted, substantiate the conclusion that
the recall amendment was not a grant of power, but instead a limitation upon the
people's right to recall. Although the supreme court had held that the people's power
to recall elective officers at will was an inherent power (see note 25 supra), the court
held after the passage of the amendment that the right to recall officers at will pursuant to city charter was limited and preempted by the amendment which imposed
recall for cause only. See State ex rel. Lynch v. Fairly, 76 Wash. 332, 136 P. 374 (1913).
44. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 34 (emphasis added).
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sions of section thirty-three (33) of this article, and to facilitate its
operation and effect without delay: Provided, That the authority
hereby conferred upon the legislature shall not be construed to grant
to the legislature any exclusive power of lawmaking nor in any way
limit the initiativeand referendum powers reserved by the people.

The proviso expressly maintains intact the people's powers of initiative and referendum.
Why was it necessary to mention the referendum and initiative
powers in a constitutional provision governing recall? As previously
suggested, 45 the courts had recognized that recall at will served the
dual function of removing a politically unpopular elective officer and
voicing disapproval of an unpopular but otherwise legal decision or
act in which the elective officer had participated. The constitutional
draftsmen of the eighth amendment clearly sought to end this dual
function of recall, and to limit the recall solely to the removal of
wrongdoers from elective office, while leaving to the people the separate political remedies of initiative and referendum by which to voice
their disapproval of particular governmental decisions. To accomplish
this separation, the constitutional framers limited the recall of elective
officers to those instances in which charges of a criminal nature had
been filed, but at the same time clearly stated that the diminution of
recall at will would in no way diminish the people's power of initiative
or referendum.
Any doubt that the amendment was intended to limit recall to
charges of wrongful conduct was dispelled by the passage of the recall
enabling legislation, now R.C.W. ch. 29.82.43 In Section 1 of the
enabling act, the legislature repeated the constitutional requirement
that recall charges recite acts of misfeasance or malfeasance in office,
or violation of the oath of office, and then added the phrase "or has
been guilty of any two or more of the acts specified in the Constitution
as grounds for recall."' 7 The use of the word "guilty" evidences the
45.
46.

See text accompanying note 27 supra.
Ch. 146, [19131 Wash. Laws 454.

47.

WAsH. RFV. CODE

§ 29.82.010 (1963) provides in full:

Whenever any legal voter or committee or organization of legal voters of the
state or of any political subdivision thereof shall desire to demand the recall and
discharge of any elective public officer of the state or of such political subdivision.
as the case may be, under the provisions of sections 33 and 34 of article I of
the Constitution, he or they shall prepare a typewritten charge. reciting that such
officer, naming him and giving the title of his office, has committed an act or acts
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legislative intent to limit the grounds for recall to charges of serious,
wrongful conduct, not for participation in unpopular decisions.
Section 1 of the act also expanded on the express words of the
constitutional amendment dealing with the language of the charges
themselves. While the eighth amendment provided only that the
charges need "state the matters complained of," the enabling act provided that the recall charges "shall state the act or acts complained of
in concise language without unnecessary repetition." 48 The language
added by the statute clearly was taken from the criminal code of
188149 which sets forth the specificity required for a criminal indictment or information. 5 0 Thus, the legislature again pronounced that
the recall should be viewed in a criminal context and not as simply a
device for expressing disapproval of an elective official's legal but unpopular conduct.
II.

RECALL AND THE COURT

The record of legislative and constitutional intent to limit the people's right to recall makes it difficult to rationalize, in terms of legal
scholarship, the abrupt judicial departure in recent years from the
clear constitutional and statutory language governing recall. The
opinions of the supreme court for more than 50 years observed the
distinctions between recall at will and recall for cause.5 1 However,
the court in Danielson v. Faymonville52 in 1967, by liberally conof malfeasance, or an act or acts of misfeasance while in office, or has violated
his oath of office, or has been guilty of any two or more of the acts specified in
the Constitution as grounds for recall, which charge shall state the act or acts
complained of in concise language, without unnecessary repetition, and shall be
signed by the person or persons making the same, give their respective post
office addresses, and be verified under oath that he or they believe the charge or

charges to be true. [Emphasis added.]
48.

WASH. REV. CODE § 29.82.010 (1963).

49.

Now codified as WASH. REv. CODE § 10.37.050(6) (1963).

50. In Gibson v. Campbell, 136 Wash. 467, 475, 241 P. 21, 24 (1925), the court
noted that there was "no difference in the thought expressed by the two statutes."
Thereafter, in State ex rel. Walter v. Houghton, 165 Wash. 220, 224, 4 P.2d I110, 1111

(1931), the court clearly pronounced the standard of criminal charge specificity as
being applicable to recall charges:

[U] nder our recall statute, the charges must be set out in language as specific
and definite as the language of a criminal information.
51. See Cudihee v. Phelps, 76 Wash. 314, 136 P. 367 (1913); Gibson v. Campbell,
136 Wash. 467, 241 P. 21 (1925); Skidmore v. Fuller, 59 Wn. 2d 818, 370 P.2d
975 (1962).
52. 72 Wn. 2d 854, 435 P.2d 963 (1967).
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struing the recall charges in determining their sufficiency, appears to
have abandoned this distinction and embarked upon a new course
favoring the recall. This change in judicial attitude toward the recall
has enhanced the potential for its abuse through the filing of false but
legally sufficient charges.5 3 The conflicts between the older and the
more current decisions concerning recall appear to reflect differences
in the governmental philosophies held by the past and the present
members of the court.
A. Pre-Danielson
The pre-Danielson cases clearly begin with a view of the eighth
amendment contrary to that expressed in the more recent cases: the
eighth amendment is not a grant, but a limitation upon the people's
inherent power to recall elective officers. 54 Thus, discussing that
55
amendment in Cudihee v. Phelps, the court noted:
The people speaking in the manner provided by law, may discharge
their public officers for any cause, or without any cause, as their laws
may provide ....

While it seems true that, under this constitutional

provision, an officer is to be removed for cause only ....
Again in Gibson v. Campbell,5 6 the court emphasized that the
eighth amendment limited the power to recall elective officers at will
and noted that the legislature and constitutional drafters required specific charges of misconduct to be made in the recall petition in order
to protect against the "vicious" and to preserve the "salutary" purposes of recall. 5 7 Recall, although political, was viewed as a serious
and drastic remedy like its constitutional counterparts, impeachment
and judicial removal for cause.5 8
The view of recall expressed in these older cases is consistent with
the intent of the legislature in the drafting of the eighth amendment to
the constitution and its enabling legislation. In addition, the court's
53. The enhanced potential for abuse was recognized by Justice Utter in his
concurring opinion in Bocek. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
54. Hilzinger v. Gillman, 56 Wash. 228. 105 P. 471 (1909).
55. 76Wash. 314,330-31. 136P. 367,373(1913).
56. 136 Wash. 467, 241 P. 21 (1925).
57. Id. at 474, 476, 241 P. at 24.
58. See, e.g., Gibson v. Campbell. 136 Wash. 467. 241 P. 21 (1925). It is no
coincidence that all three sanctions against elective officers-judicial removal, impeachment and recall-deem malfeasance in office as grounds. See notes 18 & 19 supra.
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strict adherence to criminal rules of sufficiency conformed to the view
that the eighth amendment was intended both to limit recall and to act
as a check on irresponsible recall charges.
B.

Recent Trend

The recent decisions of the court reason from the premise that the
recall provisions of the state constitute a right of the people created by
the constitution. These decisions classify recall as one of a plebescite
trinity which also includes the powers of referendum and initiative. 59
The issue of "cause" for recall is then less important to the court than
the encouragement of citizen participation in government through the
ballot box.
This recent view is evidenced in the court's remark in State ex rel.
Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, that "Our constitution
establishes a very broad right of the electorate to recall elective public
officials."' 60 Indeed, at least one member of the court, Chief Justice
Hale, has classified the powers of recall, initiative and referendum to
61
be virtually coextensive powers of self-government:
The Eighth Amendment was and is one of a trinity of devices, along
with the initiative and the referendum, designed to insure insofar as
political institutions and popular political genius permits, a fair measure of self-government during an era when, for nearly a century,
there have developed seemingly inexorable forces tending to remove
the powers of government farther and farther from the governed.
Moreover, approval of recall at will is suggested by the court's decision in Danielson-after54 years of judicial silence on the subjectto liberally construe language of the charges in favor of the recall petitioners.6 2 Thus, the present court now regards the eighth amendment
as a grant of the power of recall at will to the people so long as the
63
charges include some allegation of impropriety.
59. See State ex rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wn. 2d
121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972), and text accompanying notes 60 & 61 infra.
60. 80 Wn. 2d 121, 123, 492 P.2d 536, 538 (1972) (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 132, 492 P.2d at 543-44 (Hale, J., concurring in part; dissenting in
part) (citations omitted).
62. Danielson v. Faymonville, 72 Wn. 2d 854, 859, 435 P.2d 963, 966 (1967).
See also Bocek v. Bayley, 81 Wn. 2d 831, 505 P.2d 814 (1973).
63. The extent to which the court has gone in finding a charge constitutionally
sufficient is evidenced in Danielson, in which the recalling petitioners alleged that a
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The court's recent position, however, as expressed in Danielson,
forfeits the restraints and balance previously built into the recall
process. To regain that desirable balance which was intended, it is
now necessary that the legislature clarify the grounds for recall and
expand the court's role as a check against abuse of the recall process.
An examination of the charges which the court has found sufficient
in recall cases demonstrates the need for reform. The litany of the
charges rarely changes. Legislative officers are accused frequently of
"vote swapping" simply because the supreme court, without more
than facial examination, has found such a charge to justify a recall
election." 4 Public executives are accused of knowingly hiring incom-

petent subordinates because the court has repeatedly (albeit reluctantly) declared this charge to justify a recall election." 5 Moreover, the
66
charges may allege acts in terms which are libelous, such as "fraud"

or "conspiracy."

67

Petitioners can level such charges with confidence that the
self-imposed limits of judicial inquiry will not require the petitioners
to offer judicial proof of the charges. Thus, petitioners are able to
accomplish what the original drafters of the constitutional amendment
intended to prevent: use of the recall simply as a device to express disapproval of an elective officer's legal but unpopular conduct. As the
water district commissioner had committed malfeasance and misfeasance in office by
circulating a petition for creation of a new water district, which act the petitioners
alleged was in conflict with the commissioner's duty to operate and maintain the
existing system. Justice Hill stated in dissent:
lI]
t is neither misfeasance, malfeasance, nor a violation of his oath of office for
Mr. Danielson to advocate that one area in a public utility district can be better
served by organizing a water district of its own. . ..
72 Wn. 2d at 863, 435 P.2d at 969. However, the majority reached an opposite conclusion by reading into the charge the unwarranted inference that a new water district
would have an adverse financial effect on the old water district:
[F] or a commissioner in office to advocate the establishment of an independent
water district, in competition with the existing public utility facilty, is patently
inconsistent with his duty . . . since the establishment of a competing water
district . . . would lead to a loss of customers, reduced revenues, and would
affect the financial stability of the district ...
Id. at 860, 435 P.2d at 967 (emphasis deleted).
64. See Pybus v. Smith, 80 Wash. 65, 141 P. 203 (1914): State ex rel. Nisbet v.
Coulter, 182 Wash. 377, 47 P.2d 668 (1935). State ex rel. Walter v. Houghton. 165
Wash. 220. 4 P.2d 1110 (1931); Roberts v. Millikin, 200 Wash. 60. 93 P.2d 393 (1939).
65. See Morton v. McDonald, 41 Wn. 2d 889. 252 P.2d 577 (1953): Danielson
v. Faymonville, 72 Wn. 2d 854, 435 P.2d 963 (1967): State ex rel. LaMon v. Westport, 73 Wn. 2d 255, 438 P.2d 200 (1968): State ex rel. Citizens Against Mandatory
Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wn. 2d 121. 492 P.2d 536 (1972): Bocek v. Bayley. 81 Wn.
2d 831. 505 P.2d 814 (1973).
66. See State ex rel. Walter v. Houghton, 165 Wash. 220. 4 P.2d 1110(1931).
67. See Skidmore v. Fuller, 59 Wn. 2d 818. 370 P.2d 975 (1962).
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constitutional drafters made clear, disapproval of an elective officer's
legal conduct is to be accomplished by the initiative or referendum
process. It is time for the legislature to reform the recall process to
facilitate its proper use as a device to remove elective officers for adequate cause only.
III.

A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REMEDY

Reform of the recall process does not require a constitutional
amendment; the necessary reform is a matter for legislative action. To
amend the recall laws for the purpose of (1) implementing the constitutional grounds for recall and (2) establishing the court's jurisdiction
to prevent election fraud by filing of patently false charges in a recall,
R.C.W. § 29.82.010 should be repealed and its subject matter set
forth in three separate statutory provisions. R.C.W. § 29.82.160, the
jurisdictional provisions of the chapter, should also be repealed and
replaced by a specific grant of judicial jurisdiction. In addition to
these amendments to the recall law, a new procedural framework
should be adopted to clarify the means by which recall charges are
filed and reviewed by the courts. The following subsections contain
proposals for new provisions in the recall chapter together with comments upon the specific purposes of each proposed provision.
Groundsfor Recall

A.

While the present text of R.C.W. § 29.82.01068 sets forth the
constitutional grounds for recall, it leaves largely unresolved the
issue whether the act or acts upon which the charges are predicated
must occur during the term of office which the elective officer is presently serving. This question has not been answered specifically by
the Washington courts, although language in Gibson v. Campbell 9
suggests that recall is restricted to acts of misconduct committed by
the elective officer during the term of office being served when the
charges are filed. 70 In those instances where an officer's wrongful con68.
69.
70.

See note 47 supra.
136Wash. 467, 241 P. 21 (1925).
In Gibson, one ground for the court's finding the recall charges insufficient was

that "[i] t appears that the sheriff is serving his second term of office. There is nothing

in the charges to show whether the acts complained of were committed during his first
or second term in office." Id. at 472, 241 P.2d at 23 (emphasis added).
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duct has prompted judicial removal, some jurisdictions have limited
the application of removal provisions to acts committed in the officer's
present term 7' while other jurisdictions permit removal for acts committed in any term. 72 The latter view is premised upon the view that
judicial removal is not penal in nature, a view shared by the Washington Supreme Court. 73 Recall, however, should not be permitted to
encompass matters occurring in past terms of office since the electorate has had an opportunity to consider those acts in choosing to
re-elect the incumbent to office. Policy considerations should preclude
recall petitioners from resurrecting campaign issues from previous
elections by filing recall charges predicated upon acts committed during prior terms of office.
The statute proposed to replace R.C.W. § 29.82.010 reads:
The grounds for recall under the provisions of sections 33 and 34 of
article 1 of the Constitution shall be an act or acts of malfeasance in
office, misfeasance in office, or a violation of the oath of office, committed by any elective public officer of the state or of any political
subdivision thereof during the term of office which he or she is presently serving. For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Malfeasance in office" means an unlawful act committed willfully by any elective public officer;
(2) "Misfeasance in office" means the fulfillment of a statutorily
imposed duty in an unlawful or improper manner by any elective
public officer;
(3)"Violation of the oath of office" means the willful neglect or
failure by an elective public officer to perform faithfully a duty imposed by law.

The proposed statute sets forth a specific definition of "malfeasance in
office": the commission of a willful, unlawful act for which the law
provides a criminal penalty.7 4 This definition conforms to the meaning
of that term at the time the constitutional recall provisions were
75
adopted by the state legislature.
71. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court. 22 Ohio St. 2d 120. 258 N.E.2d
594 (1970); State v. Scott. 35 Wyo. 108. 247 P. 699. 711 (1926): see also Annot..
42 A.LR.3d 691 (1972): (f. State ex rel. Austin v. Superior Court. 6 Wn. 2d 61. 66.

106 P.2d 1077. 1079 (1940) (Robinson. J., dissenting).
72. See, e.g., Newman v. Strobel. 236 App. Div. 371. 259 N.Y.S. 402. 404 (1932).
73. State ex rel. Zempel v. Twitchell. 59 Wn. 2d 419. 430. 367 P.2d 985. 992 (1962).
74. See note 39 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 38 50 supra.
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"Misfeasance in office," as defined in the proposed statute, includes
the improper acts of public officers which have been committed in the
course of their official conduct. Although traditionally misfeasance
was considered a less aggravated form of impermissible, official conduct than malfeasance, misfeasance in office was punishable at
76
common law by criminal penalty.
A " violation of the oath of office," as defined in the proposed provisions, includes violation of the public trust imposed by oath on
public officers to perform their duties faithfully. 77 A violation of this
trust would include either the neglect of duties or the failure to perform such duties. Such violations constituted nonfeasance and were
punishable by criminal penalty and removal at the time of the passage
78
of the recall provisions.
B.

Initiatingthe Recall
The proposed provisions of R.C.W. § 29.82.0207 9 parallel the pres-

ent provisions of R.C.W. § 29.82.010 and make no change in the
present means of preparing recall charges. However, the proposed
provisions do modify the oath which must accompany the charges
themselves. The proposed statute would require persons submitting
the charges to have knowledge of the facts upon which the stated
grounds for recall are based, rather than simply a belief that the
76. At common law misfeasance in office occurred when an official committed a
breach of a positive statutory duty or improperly performed a discretionary act with
improper or corrupt motives. Commonwealth v. Peoples, 345 Pa. 576, 28 A.2d 792
(1943); Robbins v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 115, 22 S.W.2d 440 (1929); Commonwealth v. Green, 205 Pa. Super. 539, 211 A.2d 5 (1965).
77. See note 41 supra.
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.20.100 (1963). See also note 40 supra.
79. The provisions proposed (new language italicized; deleted language indicated
by ellipsis periods) for WASH. REV. CODE § 29.82.020 read as follows:
Whenever any legal voter or committee or organization of legal voters of the
state or of any political subdivision thereof shall desire to demand the recall and
discharge of any elective public officer of the state or of such political subdivision,
as the case may be, under the provisions of sections 33 and 34 of article 1 of the
Constitution, he, she, or they shall prepare a typewritten charge, reciting:
(1) the name of the officer;
(2) the title of the office;
(3) the groundsfor holding a recall election;
. . . which charge shall . . . be signed by the person or persons preparing the
same, give their respective post office addresses, and be verified under oath that
...the persons bringing such charges have knowledge of the facts upon which
the stated grounds for recall are based.
Compare the language of the present statute at note 47 supra.
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charges are true. The purpose of this amendment is to discourage frivolous, scurrilous and baseless charges against a public officer made
solely for the purpose of harassing that officer in the performance of
his elective duties. The proposed change in the oath to accompany
recall charges permits the state to initiate a perjury action against persons who knowingly file false recall charges. 80 Such penalties are necessary to protect the integrity of the recall process and to emphasize
that recall is a serious and drastic process by which wrongdoers in elective office are removed, not simply a process by which their unpopular
decisions are reversed.
C.

Petitionfor Recall-Sufficiency of Grounds

The proposed provisions of R.C.W. § 29.82.030 clarify the present
language of R.C.W. § 29.82.010, which states in pertinent part:
[T] he charge shall state the act or acts complained of in concise language, without unnecessary repetition ....
The proposed statute provides:
The grounds for recall to be recited in a petition for recall are sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the act or acts charged
therein are clearly and distinctly set forth in ordinary and concise
language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. The provisions
of this section shall bear the same judicial construction as R.C.W.
§ 10.37.050(6).
The language of the present R.C.W. § 29.82.010 has been found by the
supreme court to parallel the language of the information and indictment sufficiency provisions of the criminal code of 1881 (now codified
as R.C.W. § 10.37.050(6)) which was in existence at the time of the
passage of recall enabling legislation. 8 As noted in Gibson v. Camp-

80. See WAsH. REV. CODE § 9.72.030 (1963). Presently. one who knowingly files a
false recall charge is guilty of a gross misdemeanor predicated upon the criminal
libel statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.58.010 (1963). However, a defendant in such a
case has the defense of qualified privilege. State v. Wilson, 137 Wash. 125. 241 P. 970
(1925). Cf. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 29214 (West 1961).
81. See Gibson v. Campbell, 136 Wash. 467, 241 P. 21 (1925): State ex rel.
Walter v. Houghton, 165 Wash. 220, 4 P.2d 1010 (1931).
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bell,82 it was undoubtedly the intent of the legislature to incorporate

the specificity standards for criminal charges into the recall provisions
by the addition of the above language. 83 The proposed statute would
simply incorporate this judicial determination into the statute to resolve any questions as to legislative intent.
D.

Ballot Synopsis-Preparation

The present provisions of R.C.W. § 29.82.020 call for a quasi-judicial determination of the validity of recall charges by either the state

Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Washington Supreme Court
or a local prosecuting attorney, depending upon the subject of the
recall charges. 84 The purpose of the proposed amendment is to end
82.

136 Wash. 467, 241 P. 21 (1925).

83.

Referring to WASH. REV. CODE §§ 29.82.010 and 10.37.050(6), the court

stated:
There ought to be observed, however, the striking similarity between the statute
enacted in 1913 to carry out the provisions of the constitutional provision for
recall and § 2055 of the criminal code.
The recall statute says: "which charges shall state the act or acts complained
of in concise language, without unnecessary repetition." Section 2055 of the
criminal code requires an indictment or information to contain "A statement
of the acts constituting the offense, in ordinary and concise language, without
repetition, and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding
to know what is intended." It will be seen that there is no difference in the
thought expressed by the two statutes.
136 Wash. at 475, 241 P. at 24 (emphasis added).
84. The full text of WASH. REV. CODE § 29.82.020 (Supp. 1973) provides:
If the recall is demanded of a state-wide elected official, the attorney general
shall determine within fifteen days of the filing of the charge whether or not the
acts complained of in the charge are acts of malfeasance or misfeasance while in
office, or a violation of the oath of office, as specified in the Constitution. If the
recall is demanded of a member of the State Senate or House of Representatives
and the legislative district of said member lies wholly within one county, the
determination shall be made by the prosecuting attorney of such county within
fifteen days of the filing of the charge. If the member's legislative district extends into
two or more counties, the attorney general shall make the determination within
the aforesaid time. If the recall is demanded of any other official, the prosecuting
attorney of the county in which the person subject to recall resides shall make
such determination within fifteen days of the filing of the charge: Provided, That
if the recall is demanded of the attorney general, the determination shall be made
by the chief justice of the supreme court of the state of Washington within fifteen
days of the filing of the charge. Upon determination that the recall charges meet
the constitutional requirements, the attorney general or the prosecuting attorney,
as the case may be, shall, within thirty days of the filing of the charge, formulate
a ballot synopsis of such charge of not to exceed two hundred words, which shall
set forth the name of the person charged, the title of his office, and a concise
statement of the elements of the charge, and shall notify the persons filing the
charge of the exact language of such ballot synopsis, and attach a copy thereof
to and file the same with the charge, and thereafter such charge shall be desig-
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this practice8 3 which does little more than delay the issuance of recall
petitions and/or delay court challenges of invalid or insufficient recall
8 6
charges.
Under present law, litigation over the sufficiency of the charges
rarely involves the two parties to the controversy, namely the persons
making the charges and the officer being subjected to recall. Instead
the prosecuting attorney or the attorney general becomes the defendant in a mandamus action either by the public officer, in the event
that the prosecutor declares the charges are sufficient, 87 or by the persons filing the charges should the prosecutor declare the charges insufficient. 88 Such lawsuits are undesirable because they do not bring the
real parties of the controversy before the court. The proposed statute
would end the quasi-judicial function of the prosecuting attorney or
the attorney general as the case may be, and simply call for the preparation of a ballot synopsis in all instances within 15 days of the filing
of otherwise valid recall charges.
E.

Ballot Synopsis-Notice to Elective Official

The only proposed modification to the current statute 89 is to create
a 15-day hiatus between the time that the ballot synopsis is prepared

Hated on all petitions, ballots and other proceedings in relation thereto by such
synopsis.
85. The proposed WNsH. REV. CODE § 29.82.040 (amending id. § 29.82.020
(Supp. 1973)) reads:
When charges demanding the recall of a public officer are filed, the officer with
whom the charge is so filed shall, within fifteen days of the filing of the
charge. formulate a ballot synopsis of such charge not to exceed two
hundred words, which shall set forth the name of the person charged.
the title of the office, and a concise statement of the elements of the charge.
and shall notify the elective officer against whom such charge or charges
have been made, and the persons filing the charge, of the exact language of
such ballot synopsis, and attach one copy thereof to and file the same
with the charge, and thereafter such charge shall be designated on all petitions. ballots and other proceedings in relation thereto by such synopsis.
86. It is noteworthy in this context that in Claussen v. Peddycord. 69 Wn.
2d 224. 417 P.2d 453 (1966), the supreme court declared that the quasi-judicial function of reviewing recall charges did not violate the constitutional separation of powers
doctrine since the review of recall charges by nonjudicial officers was subject to an
ultimate judicial determination should the parties feel aggrieved.
87. See, e.g., Bocek v. Bayley, 81 Wn. 2d 831. 505 P.2d 814(1973).
88. See. e.g., State exv rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks. 80
Wn. 2d 121,492 P.2d 536 (1972).
89. The text of the current statute. WASH. REV. CODE § 29.82.030 (Supp. 1972).
provides:
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and served upon the elective officer and the persons filing the recall
charge, and the commencement of circulation of the recall petitions. 90
It is during this period that an elected officer feeling aggrieved by the
charges, or persons filing charges who disapprove of the language of
the ballot synopsis, should seek judicial relief from the superior court.
Under present law, actions to enjoin or compel recall election may
be brought both before and after the circulation of the recall petitions.
An action commenced by the officer following the circulation of recall
petitions has a serious flaw: should the plaintiff prevail in challenging
the sufficiency of one or more, but less than all, of the charges, the
victory is hollow because the Washington court has consistently held
that a recirculation of the petitions is not required even though certain
charges thereon are declared insufficient. 9 1 To end such futile actions
Upon being notified of the language of the ballot synopsis of the charge,
the persons filing the charge shall cause to be printed on single sheets
of paper of good quality twelve inches in width by fourteen inches in length
and with a margin of one and three-fourths inches at the top for binding,
blank petitions for the recall and discharge of such officer. Such petitions
shall be substantially in the following form:
WARNING
Every person who signs this petition with any other than his true
name, or who knowingly signs more than one of these petitions, or who
signs this petition when he is not a legal voter, or who makes herein any false
statement, shall be fined, or imprisoned, or both.
Petition for the recall of (here insert the name of the office and of the person
whose recall is petitioned for) to the Honorable (here insert the name and
title of the officer with whom the charge is filed).
We the undersigned citizens of (the State of Washington or the political
subdivision in which the recall is invoked, as the case may be) and legal
voters of the respective precincts set opposite our respective names, respectfully
direct that a special election be called to determine whether or not (here insert
the name of the person charged and the office which he holds) be recalled and
discharged from his office, for and on account of (his having committed the act or
acts of malfeasance or misfeasance while in office, or having violated his oath of
office, as the case may be) in the following particulars: (here insert the synopsis of
the charge); and each of us for himself says- I have personally signed this petition;
I am a legal voter of the State of Washington in the precinct and city (or town)
and county written after my name, and my residence address is correctly
stated.
90. The proposed WASH. REV. CODE § 29.82.050 (amending WASH. REV. CODE §
29.82.030 (Supp. 1973)) reads (new language italicized):
Fifteen days after being notified of the language of the ballot synopsis
of the charge, the persons filing the tharge shall cause to be printed on
single sheets of paper of good quality, twelve inches in width by fourteen
inches in length, and with a margin of one and three-quarters inches at the
top for binding, blank petitions for the recall and discharge of such officer.
Such petitions shall be substantially in the following form: [see balance of
present statute].
91. See Morton v. McDonald, 41 Wn. 2d 889, 252 P.2d 577 (1953).
The rule is that, at this stage of the proceedings, the recall petitions having been
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and to prevent insufficient charges from being circulated to the public,
actions challenging recall charges should be brought in the 15-day
period prior to the circulation of recall petitions.
F.

Enforcement Provisions-Jurisdiction-Appeals

Subsections (1), (2) and (3) of the proposed statute 12 restate the
court's present jurisdiction in reviewing charges. ,93 Subsections (1) and
circulated, signed, and canvassed, only the complete failure of all the charges to
meet the statutory requirements can justify enjoining the holding of the election:
one charge meeting the statutory requirement is sufficient.
Id. at 892, 252 P.2d at 578; accord, Danielson v. Faymonville. 72 Wn. 2d 854. 435
P.2d 963 (1967).
92. The proposed statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 29.82.060 (amending WASH.
REV. CODE § 29.82.160(1963)) reads:
Any person aggrieved by the filing of recall charges or by the failure thereafter of an election official to perform duties in relation to the recall, may petition
for relief to the superior court of the county constituting or containing any
political subdivision in which the recall is invoked. In reviewing such
petition, the superior court shall have the jurisdiction to consider the
following grounds:
( 1) The sufficiency or specificity of such recall charge or charges:
(2) The sufficiency or specificity of the ballot synopsis of such recall
charge or charges:
(3) The issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of any
act required of a public officer or to prevent the performance by any such officer
of any act in relation to recall not in compliance with law;
(4) The existence or lack of facts establishing prima facie the truthfulness of such recall charge or charges provided, That any person challenging
any such recall charge pursuant to this subsection four (4) shall have
the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
The supreme court shall have like original jurisdiction in relation to state
officers and revisory jurisdiction over the decisions of the superior courts:
provided, That any proceeding pursuant to subsections (I), (2) and (4)
of this statute shall be commenced within fifteen days from the time that
notice is given of the preparation of a ballot synopsis of such recall
charge or charges and, further provided, That any proceeding pursuant to
subsection (3) of this statute shall be commenced within ten days from
the time the cause of complaint arises.
Actions brought pursuant to this statute shall be considered an
emergency matter of public concern, take precedence over other cases and be
speedily heard and determined. Any proceeding to review a decision of any
superior court shall be begun and perfected within fifteen days after its
decision in a recall election case and shall be by the supreme court considered an emergency matter of public concern and speedily heard and
determined.
93. The current statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 29.82.160 (1963), provides:
The superior court of the county constituting or containing any political
subdivision in which the recall is invoked shall have original jurisdiction
to compel the performance of any act required of any public officer or to prevent
the performance by any such officer of any act in relation to the recall not in
compliance with law.
The supreme court shall have like original jurisdiction in relation to state
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(2) permit the court to test the legal sufficiency of either recall charges
94
or ballot synopses in accordance with the court's past decisions.
Subsection (3), in accordance with the current statute and past court
decisions, grants the court power to compel correction of ministerial
errors. In such instances, the court has in the past enjoined recall elections where the petitions contained the names of more than one officer, 95 where the petitioners failed to obtain the appropriate number of
signatures within the statutory time limits96 and where the petitioners
97
failed to file a campaign finance statement required by law.
Subsection (4) of the proposed statute would expand the jurisdiction of the courts to include the power to make factual determinations
with regard to recall charges. In keeping with the suggestions of Justice Utter, subsection (4) would permit superior courts to consider:
The existence or lack of facts establishing prima facie the truthfulness
of such recall charge or charges provided,That any person challenging
any such recall charge pursuant to this subsection four (4) shall have
the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
While this expansion of court jurisdiction would mark a departure
from judicial tradition, it would not be inconsistent with the purposes
behind the recall provisions98 nor with the court's own recognition of
the legislature's power to grant the court jurisdiction. 99
In accordance with judicial tradition, the supreme court, while implicitly recognizing that an election result may be indirectly affected
officers and revisory jurisdiction over the decision of the superior courts:
Provided, That any proceeding to compel or prevent the performance of any such
act shall be begun within ten days from the time the cause of complaint
arises and shall be considered an emergency matter of public concern and
take precedence over other cases, and be speedily heard and determined. Any
proceeding to review a decision of any superior court shall be begun and
perfected within fifteen days after its decision in a recall election case and
shall be by the supreme court considered an emergency matter of public
concern, and speedily heard and determined.
94. See Cudihee v. Phelps, 76 Wash. 314, 136 P. 367 (1913); Thiemans v.
Sanders, 102 Wash. 453, 173 P. 26 (1918); Skidmore v. Fuller, 59 Wn. 2d 818,
370 P.2d 975 (1962); Bocek v. Bayley, 81 Wn.2d 831, 505 P.2d 814 (1973).
95. See McCush v. Pratt, 113 Wash. 7, 192 P. 964 (1920).
96. See Tabor v. Walla Walla, 77 Wash. 579, 137 P. 1040 (1914); Rominger
v. Nellor, 97 Wash. 693, 167 P. 57 (1917) (insufficient number of signatures
due to withdrawal of signatures); Mills v. Nickeus, 81 Wash. 409, 142 P.
1145 (1914).
97. See State ex rel. McCauley v. Gilliam, 81 Wash. 186, 142 P. 470 (1914).
98. See discussion of legislative history surrounding the recall provisions in Part I supra.
99. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
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by a court decision, has declared that factual disputes pertaining to
election issues should not be litigated by the courts but decided by the
people. 0 0 Thus, it is not surprising that when first construing Section
14 of the 1913 recall act in Cudihee v. Phelps,'01 the court limited the
scope of its own jurisdiction.
In Cudihee, the appellant, the King County Sheriff, sought to have
recall charges against him quashed on numerous grounds, one of
which was that the charges were untrue. The court deferred to the
people and refused to consider the merits of the charges: 10 2
It may be that the courts have jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency
of the statement of the allegations made as cause for removal if presented in a proper proceeding involving the question of the calling of
the election, but the trial of the question of whether such cause actually exists, and as to whether the officer shall be discharged, is to be
had before the tribunal of the people and decided by them at the polls.
The Cudihee court did not, however, exclude the possibility that the
jurisdiction of the court could be expanded to make such determinations. The court noted specifically that jurisdiction over the truth of
the charges simply had not been expressly granted: 103 "Express constitutional and statutory provisions may make such questions triable in
the courts, but we have no such provisions."
Both of these propositions enunciated in Cudihee have received
support from the supreme court in virtually every case involving a
recall campaign.' 0 4 In no instance, however, has the court suggested
or intimated that should the legislature grant it the power to make a
prima facie determination of the truth of recall charges, that such jurisdiction would be inappropriate.
100. See Ford v. Logan. 79 Wn. 2d 147, 151, 483 P.2d 1247. 1249 (1971): State
ex rel. O'Connell v. Cramer. 73 Wn. 2d 85, 436 P.2d 786 (1968): State ex rel. Donohue
v. Coe. 49 Wn. 2d 410. 302 P.2d 202 (1956): State ex rel. Griffiths v. Superior
Court. 92 Wash. 44, 159 P. 101 (1916).
101.
76Wash. 314. 136 P. 367(1913).
102. Id. at331, 136P. at373.
103. Id. at 331, 136 P. at 374. In Cudihee, the court also noted that the legislature had the power to convert the issue from a political to a judicial one:
While it seems true that, under this constitutional provision, an officer is to be removed for cause only: yet, the question being purely a political one, unless expressly provided otherwise by statute or constitution, it is manifest that the tribunal before which the sufficiency of the cause is to be tried is that of the people.
Id. at 330-3 I, 136 P. at 373 (emphasis added).
104. See, e.g., Gibson v. Campbell. 136 Wash. 467. 241 P. 21 (1925): Skidmore
v. Fuller, 59 Wn. 2d 818. 370 P.2d 975 (1962).

Recall in Washington
Indeed, in the context of election fraud, the legislature has recognized the need for judicial intervention in the electoral process. In
R.C.W. § 29.04.030 the legislature granted the courts jurisdiction to
prevent and correct both election frauds and election errors. 10 5 This
jurisdictional grant has been accepted without question by the
court.

10 6

A recall election predicated upon charges which are without factual
foundation is clearly an election fraud; it is no different than an attempt by a candidate to seek an elective office for which he lacks statutory qualifications. In both instances the voting public is directed to
make a choice where in fact no choice exists. In the instance of the
unqualified candidate, his candidacy is void; a vote for him is a
wasted vote. 107 The same holds true for the recall of an elected officer
falsely charged with wrongful acts; a vote against him is more than
simply unfair to him, it represents an effort to distract, thwart and
105. WASH. REV.CODE § 29.04.030 (Supp. 1973) provides:
Any justice of the supreme court, judge of the court of appeals, or judge
of the superior court in the proper county shall, by order, require any person
charged with error, wrongful act or neglect to forthwith correct the error, desist
from the wrongful act, or perform the duty and to do as the court orders or
to show cause forthwith why the error should not be corrected, the wrongful
act desisted from or the duty or order not performed, whenever it is made
to appear to such justice or judge by affidavit of an elector that:
(1) An error or omission has occurred or is about to occur in printing
the name of any candidate on official ballots; or
(2) An error other than as provided in subsections (1) and (3) of this
section has been committed or is about to be committed in printing the
ballots; or
(3) The name of any person has been or is about to be wrongfully placed
upon the ballots; or
(4) A wrongful act other than as provided for in subsections (1) and (3)
of this section has been performed or is about to be performed by any
election officer; or
(5) Any neglect of duty on the part of an election officer other than as provided
for in subsections (1) and (3) of this section has occurred or is about
to occur.
An affidavit of an elector under subsections (1) and (3) above when relating
to a primary election must be filed with the appropriate court no later than the
second Friday following the closing of the filing period for nominations for
such office and shall be heard and finally disposed of by the court not later
than five days after the filing thereof.
106. See State ex rel. Kurtz v. Pratt, 45 Wn. 2d 151, 157, 273 P.2d 516, 520 (1954),
wherein the court states:
If we should refuse to act in the instant matter, we would be remiss in
our duty as members of the court of last resort of this state, in that we
would disregard the responsibility relative to the protection and orderly
conduct of elections tendered to us by the legislature in its enactment of
Rem. Rev. Stat., § 5202 [now WASH. REV. CODE § 29.04.030].
107. See State ex rel. Peters v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 662, 127 P. 310 (1912).
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obstruct an elected officer's attempt to perform his public duties. In
each instance it is the voters who suffer. Holding false elections erodes
the confidence of the people in the ballot box. Those persons who seek
to shape issues by filing recall actions should utilize a more appropriate remedy, the initiative or the referendum, whereby the issues
raised can be clearly presented through public debate.108
In addition to expanding the jurisdiction of the courts, the proposed
statute, while retaining previously existing legal remedies, would
permit an elected officer to obtain prompt and meaningful judicial relief following the preparation of a ballot synopsis. By making the
elected officer the party moving for judicial intervention, the statute
provides its own check against abuse in two ways: first, it is unlikely
that elective officers who are aware that charges against them have a
foundation in fact will seek judicial relief; and second, a judicial determination that the charges are prima facie sufficient obviously
would be detrimental to any public officer and therefore should make
an officer reluctant to seek judicial review. The wording of the proposed statute is such that while the relief of testing the prima facie
truth of charges is available, as a practical matter its exercise will be
limited to those instances in which charges are so utterly frivolous,
scurrilous or false that the charged official may seek judicial relief
with little fear of an adverse result.
On the other hand, persons bringing recall charges will be aware
that should their charges be utterly without factual basis, they will be
subject to test in court, again reducing the likelihood that such
charges will in fact be filed. To the extent that this would occur, the
constitutional intent of limiting recall to charges for cause would be
served.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A resolution of the conflicts in judicial recall cases and the reinstatement of the constitutional standards of recall cannot await a
change of perspective in the supreme court. Recall should not serve as
a device to remove politically unpopular elective officers, or to voice
disapproval of unpopular but otherwise legal decisions or acts in
which elective officers have participated. Use of the recall process
108.

Paget v. Logan. 78 Wn. 2d 349, 474 P.2d 247 (1970).

Recall in Washington
should be limited solely to removal of a wrongdoer from elective
office. It is appropriate that the legislature heed Justice Utter's message and, through amendments to the enabling legislation, redirect use
of the recall so that it functions as intended in the Washington governmental system.
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APPENDIX
A survey of the recall records in the possession of the 38 elected
county auditors in Washington, and the King County Department of
Records and Elections, produced the following statistics:
Total number of recall petitions filed in the following 10 year periods:
3
1913-1923 ......
.........................
2
.........................
1923-1933 ......
8
.........................
1933-1943 ......
0
.........................
1943-1953 ......
7
.........................
1953-1963 ......
37
.........................
1963-1974 .......
57**
The number of officers against whom recall petitions have been filed:
23
.......................
School officials ......
8
Mayors .......
...........................
15
...................
City Council members .....
9
County officers ......
.......................
0**
State legislators ............................
9
P.U.D. Commissioners .......................
2
....................
Justices of the Peace .....
66**
Total number of elective officers whose recall
....................
has been voted upon ......

56

Total number of officers recalled ....

31

...............

-* The disparity between the number of recall petitions filed and the number
of officers against whom recall petitions have been filed suggests that some
petitions contained the names of more than one officer. Although such petitions
are procedurally invalid, McCush v. Pratt, 113 Wash. 7, 192 P. 964 (1920), such
petitions apparently went unchallenged.
***
But see Roberts v. Millikin, 200 Wash. 60, 93 P.2d 393 (1939) (challenge of
recall charges against state senator). The recall petition litigated in this case was filed
with the King County Auditor and apparently escaped the notice of the county's tabulator.

